Hello Lionel Richie

An interesting turn of events occurred whilst releasing our article series on Lonely Lantern (the Chinese APT previously with no name, working to the Guangdong SSD).

As most of our readers will have been aware, a brand new Twitter account was created to reply to our tweet in advance of the second article where we exposed Guangdong MSS officer 1 as Zhao Jianfei, working with Li and Dong to support and direct their intrusion activity from Chengdu.

At the time, we noted this post and found it interesting (not least for the gif choice) but put it on the back burner given other investigations and leads we were following up on. However, what piqued our interest further was the fact this account and its comment was later deleted. 

Why would Mr. Ren reach out to us on this public forum and tweet that he is the MSS officer we were looking for? Does he have something he wants to get off his chest? The Twitter bio translates to ‘roaming the streets of Guangzhou’. Seems to fit with the brief of the GSSD. 

We decided to investigate (initially as a bit of fun on a rainy day) but as you will see, it is clear that Ren Yuntao is entwined with Lonely Lantern. 

Here’s what we know.

Ren Yuntao (任云韬)

The Twitter profile is in the name of Ren Yuntao. However, the profile itself is quite sparse, having being created the same month as posting. And it appears he only engaged with us. A keen watcher of our work? A super fan perhaps.

So, apart from being a Lionel Ritchie fan, what else could we find on Mr Ren? His Twitter profile didn’t give us much so we decided to start at the beginning and where we know hackers from Lonely Lantern reside: Chengdu.

Mr. Ren it seems went to the same school as Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi (the indicted hackers we mentioned in Article 1). Ren studied a Masters program at the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), in Chengdu. 

His studies led to him gaining experience in the development of software, defense and forensic analysis of information systems.

Department of Computer Science and Engineering Master’s students at UESTC (124 in total). Ren Yuntao’s name appears 8^th along in the third para.

Ren’s Master’s thesis, submitted in December of 2006 is titled “Malicious Code Anti-Detection Technology Research Based on Dynamic Binary Modification” (基于二进制多态变形的恶意代码反检测技术研究). His supervisor whilst completing his studies was Li Yichao (李毅超).

We set about delving into Ren’s thesis to see what we could find (it is quite dry in places and we wouldn’t recommend it as bedtime reading). Yet, there are some nteresting nuggets. An example is on page 71. Here, Ren provides his acknowledgement to ‘Pinkeyes’, a ‘famous network security figure within China’, referring to him as his ‘comrade in arms’. An interesting phrase to use.

Later, on page 74, Ren details his research projects and achievements throughout his graduate studies. Of specific note to us was his involvement in the ‘design and realisation of a Sichuan State Security Department (SSSD) programme’. 

Highlighted section: Mention of Sichuan SSD in Ren’s thesis

The last accomplishment Ren lists (point 6) is his participation as a “core technician in a “major” university project with designator XXX”. Suspicious – a project so sensitive it needs to be redacted but high profile enough to include in a thesis detailing your work achievements…

Following on from his success with sensitive projects and MSS programmes in Sichuan, Ren appears to have been quite busy, staying on at UESTC as a post-grad and publishing two papers. One of which was on the topic of detecting malware on registry Hive files.

Li Yichao (李毅超)

Cited in Ren’s papers and listed as Ren’s supervisor at the UESTC is Li Yichao (李毅超).  It was Mr Ren himself who wrote that Li Yichao gave him the National Network Security programme opportunity. So, who is Li Yichao?

Well, here is his CV.

Given he is an academic, his openness is our advantage. He notes his many plaudits, including ‘winning second prize from a certain ministry of the country’ and states some of his many students have gone on to work for ‘public and national security departments’. Could Ren be one of these individuals? 

Let’s recap: Ren has worked closely with a supervisor who openly talks of his links to government bodies and ministries within China. Ren himself has commented on his time working for the Sichuan State Security Department and other mysterious organisations that require redacted material whilst at UESTC. So what else can we find on Ren following his departure from academia?

Chengdu Jiuyan Technology Company Ltd. (成都九眼科技有限公司)

Also known as Chengdu Nine Eyes Technology Co Ltd., this company was established in July 2018 specialising in technology development, computer software and network engineering.

Two individuals are associated with the company. The first is the supervisor Xu Jiayou (徐嘉幼), holding just 1% of the company. The second is the executive director and general manager Ren Yuntao, with a registered stake of 99% in Chengdu Jiuyan.

The address is listed as Room 1, Floor 1, Building 1, 56 Changjiang East Second Street, Huayang Avenue, Tianfu New District, Chengdu.

Interestingly, there are a number of other companies who also claim to reside in Room 1, Floor 1, Building 1 of 56 Changjiang East Second Street in Chengdu including:

• Chengdu Hashmai Block Technology Co. Ltd
• Sichuan Shuanglin Jiayue Property Management Co. Ltd
• Shuju Chengdu Technology Co. Ltd
• Douxing Culture Communications Chengdu Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Yinchi Culture Media Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Vines Interactive Entertainment Technology Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Tianfu Hualong Petroleum Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Renhe Daoyuan Enterprise Management Consulting Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Jingwei Zhidao Enterprise Management Consulting Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Feihang Zhiyun Technology Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Als Technology Co. Ltd
• Chengdu Aiweili Trading Co. Ltd

That’s a lot of companies to be sharing 1 room.

Given it location, lack of internet presence and the individuals associated with it – a front company springs to mind.

Lingma Information Technology Company Limited (凌码信息技术上海有限公司)

Upon leaving academia, Ren appears to have obtained a job in the private sector as the Head of Information Security at Lingma Information Technology Co. Ltd. Once again, all roads lead back to Chengdu.

This is an extract of a book written by UESTC masters alumnus Xu Sheng from the Network Attack and Defense Lab, to which Ren Yuntao offers his review.

Ren Yuntao book review of 游戏外挂攻防艺术 (The Art of Game Plugin: Attack and Defense) by 徐胜 (Xu Sheng)

Head of Information Security sounds like a grand title. The company Ren worked for (Lingma) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Singapore’s Nyber company. Nyber was established in 2010 under CEO Zhang Taiyong（张台涌). It is described as a company committed to research and development of high-end technology, with its business scope covering China and overseas regions and its products often being used in government fields. 

Lingma has a base in Chengdu. The address is given as Area C, Floor 10, Sector F of the 9th Building of High-Tech Incubation Park, Tianfu Avenue, Gaoxin District, Chengdu. 

Does this address seem familiar? It did to us. It is in the same high tech zone as Chengdu Hanke, the front company created by Dong Jiazhi and exposed in article 1 of our series on Lonely Lantern.

Company profile of Lingma

Just like déjà vu, our searching led us back to UESTC in Chengdu. In 2014, Lingma were advertising positions within its company on the UESTC webpage (www1.cduestc.cn), aiming to recruit system software engineers, interface software engineers, and information security evaluation managers. Could this be where Ren first came across Lingma and led to his career in ‘Information Security’?

Lingma scholarship at SWPU

Further searches around Lingma shows the company’s ties to other universities in Chengdu. For example, it provides a scholarship program with Southwest Petroleum University (https://www.swpu.edu.cn/info/1248/1113.html) at an investment of 3000 RMB per year.

Browsing the website for SWPU, there are a number of articles outlining Lingma’s involvement with the university under its scholarship scheme. 

One particular article caught our eye. It was posted on the 9^th June 2016, and describes how the scholarship awarding ceremony for the Lingma Scholarship took place a day earlier at SWPU.

It states that the director of the institute, ZHAO Gang (学院院长赵刚), was present at the ceremony and gave a speech to the students. The Deputy Secretary of the institute’s party committee, YU Hui (学院党委副书记余辉) was also present alongside Secretary LIU Xiang from the institute’s group committee, who hosted the event (学院团委书记刘翔). The person representing the Chengdu R&D Centre of the Lingma Company is named as a Mr. Ren Weitao (凌码信息技术有限公司成都研发中心负责人任伟韬先生).

Is it a coincidence that another Mr. Ren also works for the same company as our Mr. Ren? We don’t believe in coincidences. Given that Lingma only has up to 50 staff, and our searches revealed nothing further on any other Ren’s working for Lingma during this time, it is safe to assume that Ren Weitao is Ren Yuntao. Was the change in name a deliberate attempt to fly under the radar? What was Ren trying to hide?

The last picture in the article is interesting and appears to depict Mr. Ren. The students are proudly displaying their awards. The caption of this group photo describes those in the picture, including the”scholarship-receiving representatives [students], the scholarship-awarding guests [Ren Weitao (任伟韬)] and the leader”.

Disclaimer: We have obfuscated the students in this image due to their lack of involvement in APT activity

Conclusion

So what do we know?

1. An individual called Ren Yuntao tweeted his implication that he was the MSS officer associated with the APT group (Lonely Lantern) working out of Chengdu and for the Guangdong SSD.
2. Ren Yuntao attended the same university as the indicted criminal hackers for Lonely Lantern and has worked with the Sichuan SSD whilst at university. His university professor also likes to talk of his close links to the MSS.
3. Ren Yuntao sets up a front company in Chengdu High-Tech Incubation Park in Tianfu High Tech zone, suspiciously similar to Chengdu Hanke (linked to Dong Jiazhi from Article 1 in this series).
4. Ren Yuntao works for Lingma and is directly involved with local universities in Chengdu, handing out scholarships to students and providing apprenticeships to support their ‘cyber security’ effort.

If it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck…

Ren – I know you were keen to talk:

Epilogue

Recap

In our last article, we identified Mr Zhao Jianfei as the MSS officer supporting Chinese hackers Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi. Mr Zhao works the Guangdong State Security Department, highlighting the direct support the Chinese government are providing criminal hackers in their illegal activities. We reached out to Mr Zhao for comment, and hear his side of the story, but we did not receive a response.

The bigger picture

It’s been a busy few months for the Chinese hacking community. Hafnium became a global threat almost overnight thanks to the zero-day exploit of the Microsoft Exchange Server compromise. Microsoft attributed Hafnium to the Chinese state. Their indiscriminate scattergun approach to deploying ransomware and infecting thousands of victims was wholly immoral and it is something we continue to monitor – get in touch if you can help.

MSS regional departments recruit Chinese criminals to conduct offensive cyber for the state. We now know this model is evolving, with regional bureaus outsourcing requirements to hackers not simply based in their region, but across the Chinese mainland – sharing expertise between provinces and seemingly working to one, broad model of a criminal, contracted service. Hafnium is a good example of this, with reports showing APTs 40 and 41 are just some of the many Chinese APTs taking advantage of the Exchange Server compromise.

The Chinese Communist Party are using APTs and hackers for hire to do their bidding, something we at Intrusion Truth have been asserting for some time. This was perhaps most noticeable during the COVID crisis, where state-backed Chinese hackers have been seen time and time again – across various regions and provinces, hacking into international companies known for researching and advancing the COVID vaccine – and doing so for malicious gains. Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi are a prime example of this. Stealing intellectual property and profiteering from the pandemic at a time of global crisis is a new low even for the MSS. 

Victims

The MSS’s choice of victims is interesting to note. It follows a now familiar pattern of Chinese contract hackers stealing IP for the CCP’s interests (COVID research, antiviral drugs, personal information on Chinese dissidents) whilst moonlighting for personal gain.

Mr Li in particular attempted a ransom operation in 2017 according to the indictment, demanding $15,000 in cryptocurrency in exchange for not leaking data. Is the Chinese state turning a blind eye to criminal activities within their borders? Are they supporting and actively tasking this criminal activity? Or is it evidence of the MSS not having as much control as they would like over the criminals they employ?

Denial

As we and many others have documented, China seems to give with one hand, and take with the other. Double standards spring to mind: 笑里藏刀 ‘a knife hidden behind a smile’. 

Public criticism of their actions does not seem to have an effect. The Chinese response is simply to deny and bite back harder. Yet we have shown the direct links between these criminal hacking groups and the MSS departments running and supporting them.

In China’s own words, cyberattacks should be ‘unequivocally condemned by all’. Perhaps a lesson out of their own book wouldn’t go a miss… 

An APT with no name

These actors and their links to the MSS challenged us. The indictment landed talking of a Chinese group working out of Chengdu. Yet we hadn’t come across them before, nor had we previously noted their connections to the GSSD. Are they part of a bigger, wider known APT (APT41 perhaps)? Are they simply ‘hackers’ for hire? Either way, it shows how difficult it is to simply partition and package Chinese hackers into APT groups – more so than previously thought.  

We wanted to take this moment and suggest a name for these actors. It seems a shame to write about a group such as this without them having an appropriate APT name… Some ideas we at Intrusion Truth came up with:

1. HYPOCRITICAL DRAGON
2. LAUGHING DAGGER 
3. LONELY LANTERN 

Other creative ideas welcome – you know how to get in touch.

Who is Mr. Zhao?

In our last article, we identified a number of front companies used by two Chengdu-based indicted hackers Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi. 

What struck us when reading the US indictment was reference to the Guangdong State Security Department (GSSD). As eager readers of Intrusion Truth will note, we discussed the Guangdong SSD in our very first article series and their use of Boysec as a front company. However we didn’t manage to identify the MSS officers behind APT3. We feel there is unfinished business here and so we set to work to uncover MSS Officer 1.

We started with an address.

GSSD HQ

Why is the Guangdong Province International Affairs Research Centre (GPIARC) interesting? Well, its claim to fame most recently comes from the 2020 indictment, revealing it as a GSSD cover company. The address: Number 5, 6^th Crossroad, Upper Nonglin Road, Yuexiu District, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province (越秀区农林上路六横道5号). 

We decided to reach out to our network of contributors, asking about the GPIARC and any previous reference to this company or their known address. We received an interesting response from a trusted source who wishes to remain anonymous. This source, with connections to the Bank of China, was able to provide a number of historic credit card statement sent to the cover address at Upper Nonglin Road. One bank statement in particular stood out.

Zhao Jianfei (赵剑飞)

On the top left corner on the image below, the corresponding address is Unit 5, 6^th Crossroad, Upper Nonglin Road, Yuexiu District, Guangzhou. Furthermore, all the transactions appear in Guangzhou, Guangdong. 

We know this address is a cover for the GSSD. So, whoever is using this address works directly for the GSSD. So, who is this MSS officer?  

Underneath the address is a single name to which the statement is addressed to: Zhao Jianfei (赵剑飞). 

Interesting. So, we know Zhao was receiving correspondence about a credit card bill, using the GSSD cover company as the address. It stands to reason that Zhao Jianfei is an MSS officer, working for the Guangdong SSD. Could he be MSS Officer 1?

Asls1027

An FBI flash memo released on the 21^st July reveals further information pertaining to the email used by MSS Officer 1 to send Li and Dong zero-day exploits for use in their APT campaign. The memo has redacted the mail provider, but the handle is the bit we need: asls1027.

Remember when we said one statement in particular from the Bank of China was interesting to us?

Well, turns out that Bank of China sent the credit card statement to the personal email of Zhao Jianfei. 

The email address was asls1027@hotmail.com.

Zhao Jianfei is an MSS officer, working for the GSSD and receiving credit card statements to the address of a GSSD cover company. Furthermore, this correspondence was sent to his personal email; the same email account that sent cyber actors a zero-day exploit for use in their illegal activities.

Zhao Jianfei has been directing Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi by providing them with malware and supporting their APT campaign.

Asls1027’s social media

As we know, humans are biased and often rely on availability heuristics: we tend to choose the least cognitively demanding option. As such, we tend to reuse email handles, passwords and so on. And it appears our Mr. Zhao falls into this category, reusing his handle across multiple social media sites.

Asls1027 has an interest in cars, posting on the car forum autohome.com.cn.

He also maintains a relatively empty yet bizarre Twitter profile. 

However none of this provided us with any more information on Zhao Jianfei himself. We know he uses the asls handle and his name is Zhao Jianfei so we decided to get even more creative, and found an interesting profile on Facebook with the stub Asls Zh.

Given the unique of the handle ‘asls’, we strongly believe this profile belongs to our Mr. Zhao. The profile picture was updated in 2014, a similar timeframe to other asls social media posts, as well as Zhao’s credit card activity in Guangdong. Zh = Zhao.

It seems Zhao was born in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. Also note Asls Zh’s current residence – Guangzhou, in Guangdong Province. The same location as the Zhao Jianfei’s credit statement. 

Asls Zh went to the PLA Information Engineering University to study Computer Science. It fits with what we know about MSS Officer 1, and his ability to deploy zero-day exploits to support criminal hackers.

Conclusion

Zhao Jianfei is MSS Officer 1. 

He grew up in Shanxi, and attended a PLA university studying computer science. He now resides in Guangdong and has been working for the GSSD from at least 2013. An email account linked to his GSSD activity was also used to send Li and Dong malware to advance their APT campaign. 

Contract hackers – check. 

Front companies – check.

MSS officer working to the Guangdong State Security Department – check.

An APT with no name

When the 7^th July indictment was released naming two Chinese hackers affiliated with the Guangdong State Security Department, it grabbed our interest. Hackers… in China…working with the MSS. Sounds right up our street. But who are Li Xiaoyu (李啸宇) and Dong Jiazhi (董家志)? How do they conduct their activity? The indictment also mentions an unnamed MSS Officer 1. Who could this be? Let’s start with the named hackers…  

FBI wanted poster naming indicted hackers Li Xiaoyu (李啸宇) and Dong Jiazhi 董家志)

Former classmates, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi studied Computer Application Technologies at the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC) in Chengdu. Mr Dong and Mr Li are not individuals we have come across before in our investigations into Chinese APTs. However, we do love a challenge. So, we set about getting to work and decided to start in the city Li and Dong are based: Chengdu.

Our findings reveal a number of spurious science and technology companies linked to the indicted actors. A familiar pattern is once again emerging… 

Chengdu Shirun Technology Company Ltd (成都诗润科技有限公司)

Let’s start with Dong Jiazhi. There is very little to go on from the indictment. However, we know Chinese APTs follow a common blueprint: One of contract hackers and specialists, front companies and an intelligence officer. 

We know Mr Li and Mr Dong are the contract hackers. So we set about digging into their connections to front companies based in Chengdu. 

It turns out Dong has been investing in a company called Chengdu Shirun Technology Company Ltd. Specifically, 30,000RMB came from Dong, who invested in the company when it was registered. This roughly equates to $4,5000 or £3,500.

Registrant of Chengdu Shirun Technology Company Ltd: Dong Jiazhi

A deeper look into this company reveals its location is 16 Tongsheng Rd, Qingyang District, Chengdu. It also provides a contact number: 18828070461.

Interestingly, this is not the only company that is linked to this contact number. It seems a number of other companies in Chengdu also share this point of contact.

Chengdu Hanke Technology Company Ltd. (成都撼科科技有限公司)

This company shares the same contact number as Chengdu Shirun but lists this as an email contact (18828070461@139.com). Additional contact numbers (18980738906 and 18190696626) are also provided. 

Contact details for Chengdu Hanke Technology Company Ltd.

Even more interesting is the change record for the company. Prior to 2019, Dong Jiazhi was listed as the company contact.

Change record for Chengdu Hanke listing Dong Jiazhi on line 3

Chengdu Hanke doesn’t have much of a presence. The website domain 51409903.1024sj.com does not exist. However, we did come across a LinkedIn profile for someone who claims to be the project manager and lead programmer – a Kevin Lynx. Further digging did not reveal anything more on this person or the company. Kevin, if you are out there – feel free to get in touch…

Chengdu Xinglan Technology Company Ltd. (成都兴蓝科技有限公司)

It seems 18828070461 is a theme. The number from Shirun and the 139 email from Hanke was also used to register another Chengdu-based technology company: Chengdu Xinglan. 

So who is behind this company? Well, as we mentioned, it shares contact details with companies linked to Dong. And Mr Dong is mentioned as the company’s primary point of contact.

Company registration details listing Dong Jiazhi as a contact person for Chengdu Xinglan on line 2.

Furthermore, records show Li Xiaoyu as Chengdu Xinglan’s legal representative, CEO and Executive Director, having a 99% stake in the company. It seems the pair intertwined at University, and expanded together into their business ventures and criminal activity concealed by front companies based in Chengdu.  

Chengdu Xinglan, detailing the 18828070461 contact email and Li Xiaoyu as the company’s legal representative.  

Chengdulzy

Li and Dong haven’t learnt to mix things up – reusing the same email number for their multiple front companies. 

And once again, this number (18828070461) was used as the registrant contact number for a domain: ‘chengdulzy.com’.

The registrant of this domain? Dong Jiazhi. Unfortunately, we haven’t found out what this domain was used for, and it now appears to have been deleted. 

Chengdu’s many Science and Technology companies

We are finding a similar pattern to previous investigations. An overlap of numbers and emails linking to contract hackers (Dong and Li), and subsequently to a number of technology companies based in Chengdu. All with little to no online presence suggests – you guessed it – front companies. 

However, what about the individuals themselves? They clearly have been busy investing in, and creating multiple technology businesses within Chengdu to act as fronts for their hacking activity. But what else have they left on the internet for us to find? 

Oro0lxy

The handle used by Li, and named in the indictment provides a helpful starting point. A quick scan of the internet shows various accounts with this handle, most now defunct or empty but the majority pertaining to hacking forums, such as the Chinese Software Developers Network (CSDN).

It seems oro0lxy has had a long standing interest in ColdFusion, using this knowledge (according to the indictment) to develop vulnerabilities in support of his APT activity.

oro0lxy posts question on CSDN ColdFusion sub forum

In keeping with his interest in this vulnerability, Li was appointed moderator of a website for ColdFusion developers, CFwindow.com, in 2012. 

However, oro0lxy was later flagged for posting scams on CSDN.

QQ account links

Looking into Li and Dong’s QQ accounts, we attempted to identify their actions and any overlaps that were interesting or of note. According to leaked databases, QQ 3120988 was associated with the display name Li Xiaoyu, whilst QQ 191956463 had historically used the username Dong Jiazhi.

We also pulled out a number of QQ groups that crossed the two hackers profiles. Specifically their QQ accounts linking to university groups such as ‘Class of 2005, Class 5’ (2005 级5 班),‘Information Security Lab’ (信息安全实验室) and ‘Computer Applications Technology Class 2’ (计算机应用技术 2 班). 

These are historic but provide useful context for what we know about the pair. Get in touch with us if you have any further information or leads pertaining to these accounts.

So… we know that Li and Dong have been indicted as hackers working to the MSS. Contract hackers – check. 

We know that they set up a number of front companies based in Chengdu to shield their APT activity. Front companies – check.

And we know they have been working together for a number of years, having met at university and remained active on Chinese hacker forums. But who specifically is behind their activity with the Guangdong State Security Department? Who is MSS Officer 1?

Tune in next week to find out… 

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